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Chapter 24
 Romania: from legal support to frontal assault
Aurora Trif and Valentina Paolucci
Post-socialist economic and political developments have produced a special type of 
 neoliberal society in  Romania, characterised by weak state institutions, high centralisation 
and collective bargaining coverage and relatively high trade  union  mobilisation power 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Before the 2008  recession, relatively strong unions had 
the upper hand in infl uencing Romanian governments to support a protectionist labour 
 legislation. Unlike most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),  Romania kept 
its pre-1989  Labour Code for quite some time (until 2003), with some minor revisions 
that removed the unions’ political obligations, such as socialist  education. Post-1989 
 legislation entitled the  social partners to bargain collectively and gave unions the  right 
to strike (Hayter et al. 2013). Collective agreements could be concluded at national, 
industry (or other sub-divisions) and company levels. Comparable only to  Slovenia, the 
 erga omnes principle ensured an automatic extension of collective agreements to cover 
all employees in the bargaining unit at cross-industry, industrial and company levels. 
The presence of the  favourability principle enshrined into law also meant, however, that 
lower-level collective agreements could only improve the provisions for employees set 
at higher levels (Trif 2016). Thus statutory regulations ensured that all employees were 
covered, at least by the provisions of cross-industry agreements (Table 24.1). 
During the 2008 crisis, Prime Minister’s Boc’s centre-right government deregulated the 
labour market, weakening both individual and collective employee rights. Amendments 
to the  Labour Code (Law 40/2011) made it easier for employers to dismiss employees, 
including shop stewards, as well as to increase workloads unilaterally and use fl exible 
working time arrangements. The adoption of the ‘so-called’  Social Dialogue Act (Legea 
dialogului social 62/2011, LDS) diminished fundamental collective rights, such as the 
right to organise; for example, it is no longer possible to unionise workers in companies 
with fewer than 15 employees, to strike or to bargain collectively (Trif 2013). By 
prohibiting cross-industry agreements in tandem with abolishing automatic extension 
of industry agreements and making it far more diﬃ  cult for unions to negotiate  company 
level agreements, in particular by raising the representativeness threshold from 33 per 
cent to more than 50 per cent, the LDS caused a massive decline in bargaining coverage 
and  union density (Table 24.1). This frontal  assault on  multi-employer bargaining 
arrangements led to a  transformation of the regulatory framework from a statutory 
system that supported collective bargaining to a so-called ‘voluntary’ system that made 
it almost impossible to negotiate new cross-industry and  industrial agreements after 
2011 (Stoiciu 2016). 
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This chapter argues that  Romania represents an extreme case of  disorganised 
 decentralisation of collective bargaining following the 2008  recession. It shows that 
developments in bargaining were  path-dependent prior to 2008, while the path-
departure was triggered by shifting statutory rights from supporting to hindering 
bargaining arrangements in the wake of the post-2008 crisis. It provides examples from 
two highly unionised industries, namely public  education and  metal, but also from the 
barely unionised  retail, to illustrate within-country variations. The selected industries 
have been aﬀ ected diﬀ erently by the  recession. The increase in international  demand 
for relatively cheap automobiles since 2008 has boosted the  labour force and turnover 
in this industry. In 2016, the value added to  GDP by services, including  education and 
 retail, was 63.3 per cent, that of industry 32.4 per cent, 13 per cent of which is due 
to the  automobile industry, and that of  agriculture 4.3 per cent (World Bank 2018). 
Government ‘ austerity’ measures included  wage cuts and some  job losses in  education 
(Guga et al. 2018). The decrease in domestic  demand in  retail led to a 9 per cent decline 
in the  labour force until 2014, after which it increased again because of growing domestic 
consumption. Apart from  decentralisation, the collapse of cross-industry and industrial 
bargaining almost quadrupled the number of workers on the  minimum wage from 2011 
to 2016 (Guga et al. 2018: 47), as employers were no longer obliged to implement wage 
rates set at higher levels. Low wages, combined with the opportunity to work in other 
Member States after joining the European Union (EU) in 2007, have led to massive 
 emigration since 2008 (Stan and Erne 2014). This has kept the  unemployment rate 
fairly low, while leading to labour shortages in most industries, including  retail (Guga 
et al. 2018). 
Table 24.1 Principal characteristics of collective bargaining in  Romania
Key features 2000 2016
Actors who negotiated collective 
agreements 
Trade unions 
Employers’ associations
Public and private employers
Trade unions and/or workers’ repre-
sentatives at  company level 
Employers’ associations 
Public and private employers
Importance of bargaining levels Company bargaining slightly more 
important than industrial and  cross-in-
dustry bargaining
Company bargaining the most 
important 
Cross-industry bargaining prohibited
Favourability principle/ derogation 
possibilities  
Favourability principle
No derogations allowed from the 
 minimum standards set by cross-
industry and  industrial agreements
Favourability principle solely at 
 company level
Collective bargaining coverage (%) 100 35
Extension mechanism (or functional 
equivalent)
Erga omnes principle at
- cross-industry 
- industrial and
- company levels
Erga omnes principle solely at  com-
pany level
Extension possible at industrial level 
de jure, but de facto no extensions 
aft er 2011 
Trade  union density (%) 35 20
Employers’ association rate (%) 80 Circa 60
Source: Trif (2016) and Appendix A1.
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Industrial relations context and principal actors
The  path-dependent  transition from  socialism to a  market economy in the 1990s resulted 
in a large degree of continuity in labour market  regulation.  Romania had one of the most 
centralised  planned economies and its  transition to a  market economy started only after 
the sudden collapse of the  communist regime in 1989 (Trif 2008). Consequently, there 
was neither a credible alternative political  elite to steer the country towards  democracy 
nor experienced domestic entrepreneurs and managers to restructure  state-owned 
enterprises. These initial circumstances contributed to a slow  transition to a  market 
economy by fairly weak governments that sought the unions’ support in exchange for 
a legal framework relatively favourable to workers (Ban 2016). In order to harmonise 
 Labour Code provisions with the EU  social  acquis during the EU  accession process in 
the mid-2000s, the restrictions on concluding fi xed-term  employment  contracts were 
relaxed in countries that had protectionist labour  legislation, such as  Romania and 
 Slovenia (Trif 2008). When foreign  investors tried to remove the legal obligation on 
employers to bargain with unions or employee representatives during the 2005  Labour 
Code revision, however, Romanian unions managed to preserve collective bargaining 
institutions with the support of the European Trade Union Confederation ( ETUC) and 
the  International Labour Organization (ILO). 
The unions’ success was short-lived, as foreign  investors, who bought a large number of 
large state-owned companies in the 2000s after the  privatisation process was simplifi ed 
and it became certain that  Romania would join the EU, triggered the  dismantling of the 
collective bargaining system during the recent crisis (Trif 2013). Apart from  lobbying a 
sympathetic centre-right government, the foreign  investors’ quest for a ‘fl exible’ labour 
market was endorsed by the ‘ Troika’ comprising the European Commission (EC), the 
 International Monetary Fund ( IMF) and the  European Central Bank (Schulten and 
Müller 2013), from which  Romania borrowed approximately €20 billion in 2010 to 
deal with the budget defi cit. Although labour market  regulation was not considered a 
cause of the crisis in  Romania (Ban 2016), the  demand for labour market fl exibilisation 
was one of the conditions for getting fi nancial assistance from the  Troika. Thus the key 
actors that aﬀ ected the legal framework for collective bargaining have been the trade 
unions and external actors rather than domestic employers. 
Most  employers’ associations were established by managers of  state-owned enterprises 
to protect their interests vis-à-vis the unions and the state in the early 1990s. After 
 privatisation, in the main, domestic owners remained aﬃ  liated to  employers’ 
associations, which generally continued to be staﬀ ed by former senior managers of 
 state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, as individual employers had suﬃ  cient power to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment at the  company level, they gave a limited 
mandate to their associations to bargain collectively at higher levels. Furthermore, 
the  fragmentation of  employers’ associations increased after 2000; the number of 
nationally representative  employers’ associations1 grew from fi ve in 2001 to 11 in 2006 
(Trif and Mocanu 2006: 25). Their number increased further to 13 in 2010, but only 
1. Their members must employ at least seven per cent of the total  labour force to be representative at the 
national level, while members of federations must employ at least 10 per cent of the industry  labour force to be 
representative at industry level.
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six of them were still representative at the national level in 2015 (Stoiciu 2016). These 
are as follows: the  General Union of Romanian Industrialists 1903 (Uniunea Generală 
a Industriaşilor din România 1903, UGIR 1903), the National Council of Private Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (Consiliul Naţional al Întreprinderilor Private Mici şi 
Mijlocii din România, CNIPMMR), the  National Confederation of Romanian Employers 
(Confederaţia Naţională a Patronatului Român, CNPR), the  Employers’ Confederation of 
Romanian Industry (Confederaţia Patronală din Industria României, CONPIROM), the 
 Romanian National Employers (Patronatul Naţional Român, PNR) and the  Concordia 
Employers’ Confederation (Confederaţia Patronală Concordia, Concordia). Members of 
the fi rst three organisations cover over 300,000 employees and those of the last three 
230,000 to 260,000 employees. Despite a relatively high density (60 to 80 per cent), 
Romanian  employers’ associations were considered amongst the weakest in the CEE 
countries (Trif and Mocanu 2006: 25), primarily due to the weak mandate from their 
members. The inherited legacies, particularly the lack of  employers’ associations during 
the  communist era and the slow  privatisation process, have made the development of 
the Romanian  employers’ associations far more diﬃ  cult than that of the unions.
In contrast, there have been fewer structural changes among the union  confederations. 
Five union  confederations have operated in  Romania since the 1990s: the  National Trade 
Union Confederation Cartel Alfa (Confederaţia Naţională Sindicală Cartel Alfa, CNS 
Cartel Alfa), the  National Confederation of Free Trade Unions from  Romania - Frăţia 
(Confederaţia Naţională a Sindicatelor Libere din România – Frăţia, CNSRL- Fratia), 
the  National Trade Union Bloc (Blocul Naţional Sindical, BNS), the  Confederation of 
Democratic Trade Unions in  Romania (Confederaţia Sindicatelor Democratice din 
România, CSDR) and the  Meridian National Trade Union Confederation (Confederaţia 
Sindicală Naţională Meridian, CSN Meridian) (Trif 2013). Their size is roughly similar, 
varying between 250,000 to 320,000 (Stoiciu 2016: 18), which is above the fi ve per 
cent of the total  labour force threshold required to be representative at national level. 
Union federations need to have at least seven per cent density to be the representative 
at the industry level. Although the adoption of the LDS radically altered only the 
representativeness threshold for  company level unions, from a third to over 50 per cent 
in 2011, it reduced the role and infl uence of both unions and  employers’ associations in 
collective bargaining, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
Extent of bargaining
The extent of collective bargaining refers to the proportion of workers in a bargaining 
unit covered by collective agreements. It is contingent primarily on the statutory 
provisions on extension mechanisms and the voluntary capacity of unions and 
employers to conclude collective agreements. After 45 years during which the party-
state determined virtually all aspects of Romanian employment relations, a pluralist 
legislative framework was adopted in the 1990s that guaranteed  freedom of association, 
the  right to bargain collectively and the  right to strike (Trif 2008). Nevertheless, heavy 
statutory  regulation of collective bargaining has persisted in post-1989  Romania to a 
higher degree than in other CEE countries. 
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Until 2011, the process of collective bargaining was primarily regulated by the  Law 
on Collective Labour Agreements (Legea privind contractul colectiv de muncă 
130/1996), which stipulated that  social partners can negotiate at national or cross-
industry, industrial or other sub-divisions, and company levels. Similar to pre-1989, 
the law allowed only a single collective agreement to be concluded by representative 
unions and  employers’ associations or individual employers at  company level, which 
had to cover all employees, regardless of their union membership in each bargaining 
unit. This  erga omnes statutory extension of collective agreements resulted in virtually 
100 per cent coverage (Table 24.1). After 2011, the legal framework provided external 
 legitimacy and support for the  social partners. As regards employers, it encouraged 
them to aﬃ  liate to representative associations, in order to have a say in the negotiations 
of the cross-industry and industrial collective agreements. Representative  employers’ 
associations, as well as union  confederations could also infl uence procedural aspects 
of collective bargaining, as all draft laws on labour issues had to be approved by the 
Economic and Social Council (Consiliul Economic şi Social), the national  tripartite 
body. Nevertheless, the density of  employers’ associations declined from 80 per cent 
in 2001 to 60 per cent in 2007. Considering that foreign  investors are more likely than 
domestic employers to opt out of  employers’ associations, this decline could be related 
to the substantial increase in foreign direct  investment in the early 2000s (Trif 2008). 
Similar to  employers’ associations, the unions also relied on the external  legitimacy 
provided by a favourable legal framework to ensure high collective bargaining coverage 
prior to 2011. Apart from the  erga omnes and favourability statutory provisions, the 
Law on Trade Unions (Legea sindicatelor 54/2003) allowed federations to become 
representative at the industrial level simply by being aﬃ  liated to a representative 
confederation at the national level. Thus even without meeting the  representativeness 
criteria concerning membership in that particular industry, unions could acquire the 
capacity to negotiate. For instance, the  Federation of Commerce Unions (Federaţia 
Sindicatelor din Comerţ, FSC) concluded an industrial agreement in 2010, covering 
all employees in  retail, although it had less than one per cent  union density (Trif 
and Stoiciu 2017). The FSC gained its representativeness from being aﬃ  liated to 
a representative confederation, namely CNS Cartel Alfa. Similarly, company-level 
unions aﬃ  liated to representative industrial federations were eligible to negotiate a 
collective agreement for all employees, regardless of their union membership. Union 
density remained relatively stable between 2000 and 2008 at about 35 per cent and 
was higher than in most CEE countries. In a context in which company-level unions 
could be deemed representative by being aﬃ  liated to a representative federation, while 
federations could acquire representativeness by being aﬃ  liated to a representative 
confederation, it was essential for the union movement to ensure that  confederations 
met the  representativeness criteria before 2010. 
By contrast,  union density at industrial and company levels began to play a crucial role 
in ensuring their eligibility to negotiate after the slashing of collective employment 
rights by means of the LDS in 2011 (Trif 2013). First, the LDS forbids collective 
bargaining across industries. Before 2011, the fi ve union  confederations and their 
employer counterparts negotiated a national collective agreement annually, stipulating 
minimum rights and obligations for the entire  labour force. The lack of such cross-
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industry agreements led to a substantial decline in collective bargaining coverage from 
98 per cent in 2010 to 35 per cent in 2011. Surprisingly, although the  provision of the 
LDS that outlaws cross-industry collective bargaining violates  ILO Convention No. 98, 
it was strongly supported by the EC and the  IMF (2012:1). Second, the LDS made it very 
diﬃ  cult to negotiate  industrial agreements. Previously,  social partners that fulfi lled the 
 representativeness criteria or were aﬃ  liated to a representative confederation could 
conclude agreements covering all employees and employers in a specifi c industry. In 
2011, the  social partners agreed that 32 industries were eligible for collective bargaining, 
of which 20 had collective agreements. The LDS redefi ned 29 broader industries, based 
on the  NACE classifi cation, eligible for collective bargaining. Social partners had to 
re-register with local courts and prove that they were representative for the redefi ned 
industries. While most union federations regained their representative status, only 
seven employers’ federations had re-applied by the end of 2012 (Hayter et al. 2013: 56–
59). Some employers interpreted the LDS as an opportunity to exit their associations, as 
the new industry agreements apply only to employers that are members of associations 
that signed the collective agreement, unless they cover more than 50 per cent of the 
 labour force in the industry (Trif 2016). The legal changes led to a major decline in 
bargaining coverage, with the number of  industrial agreements falling from 20 in 2008 
to seven in 2014 ( Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection 2014). Formally, 
 public sector employees, such those working in  education, continued to be covered by 
industrial collective agreements after 2011. In 2009, however, the government had 
already disregarded the provisions of existing collective agreements by unilaterally 
changing both  procedures for setting wages and substantive provisions (Stoiciu 2016). 
No new industrial collective agreements were concluded in the  private sector between 
2011 and 2015. 
Summing up, the post-1989 legal framework ensured high collective bargaining coverage 
until the 2008  recession in  Romania. In contrast, the government’s frontal attack on 
collective employment rights after 2008, including the prohibition of cross-industry 
collective bargaining and the removal of the  erga omnes  extension mechanism at the 
industrial level, led to a steep decline in the extent of bargaining (Appendix A1.A). The 
statutory  extension mechanism is still in place at the  company level, where generally 
the actual terms and conditions of employment are set (Trif 2016). This means that all 
employees are covered by company-level collective agreements, regardless of whether 
they are union members. Nevertheless, the LDS has reduced the capacity of unions 
to enter into negotiations at the  company level, at which new provisions on union 
 recognition and representativeness apply. These provisions will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Security of bargaining
Security of bargaining is related to union security. This depends both on the statutory 
provisions on fundamental union rights, as well as on the voluntary support oﬀ ered 
by employers to unions in the  recruitment and  retention of members. Similar to other 
CEE countries, the voluntary element of bargaining security in  Romania has historically 
been weak. As employers’  attitudes towards collective bargaining have always been 
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contingent on their own ideology and experience with unions, no drastic changes 
have occurred since the 2000s. The statutory framework shifted radically, from being 
rather supportive before 2011 to being obstructive thereafter (Trif 2013). The LDS has 
undermined basic union rights in relation to the  freedom of association,  recognition for 
collective bargaining purposes and the  right to strike (Trif 2016). 
First, the new regulations make it virtually impossible for unions to conclude any 
collective agreements that would cover workers in small companies. In a context in 
which cross-industry agreements are no longer negotiable, and  industrial agreements 
are binding mainly for large employers, which are more likely to join an association, 
small companies have been automatically excluded from the remit of collective 
bargaining. This is because the LDS requires a minimum of 15 workers from the same 
company to form a union, while before 2011 15 employees working in the same profession 
could form a union. Company-level unions also need over 50 per cent density to be 
entitled to bargain. Hence, it is no longer possible to unionise workers in companies 
with fewer than 15 employees, which accounted for over 90 per cent of companies in 
2012 (Trif 2016). Although those workers were rarely unionised before 2011, they were 
nevertheless covered by the provisions of cross-industry and  industrial agreements. 
Second, the LDS makes it far more diﬃ  cult for unions to negotiate agreements at 
 company level due to modifi cations of the  representativeness criteria (Trif 2016). Many 
unions lost their  right to bargain, as the new law stipulates that they must represent 
over half of the  labour force, compared with one-third under the previous law. If there 
are no representative unions, elected employee representatives negotiate collective 
agreements, subject to the  favourability principle. In companies in which  union density 
is below 50 per cent, employees may be represented in collective bargaining by the 
representative union federation to which the  company level union is aﬃ  liated (Stoiciu 
2016). Before 2015, federations could negotiate at  company level alongside elected 
employee representatives, who were the only ones entitled to sign agreements. Between 
2011 and 2015, 86 per cent of company collective agreements were signed by elected 
employee representatives, with or without representatives of union federations (Figure 
24.1), while previously company-level unions had signed all agreements. Unions 
that lost their representative status continued to have a role by supporting employee 
representatives. Union  oﬃ  cials reported that the negotiation process is more complex, 
however, because employers have more control over employee representatives.
Third, the laws adopted in 2011 hinder employees’ rights to organise strikes in three, 
interrelated ways (Trif 2013). First, the LDS obliges parties in confl ict to seek  conciliation 
before a strike could be called, while before 2011 the use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism was optional. Second, the LDS forbids unions to organise industrial action 
if their demands require a legal solution to solve the confl ict. In addition, the LDS 
introduced a peace-clause removing the possibility to call a strike on the duration of a 
collective agreement, even if its provisions are not implemented. Third, workers involved 
in industrial action lose all their employment rights, except their  health-care  insurance, 
while previously they lost only their wages. Furthermore, company-level union  oﬃ  cials 
used to be protected against  dismissal for two years after they completed their mandate 
under the old laws, while under the new laws they are no longer protected when their 
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mandate ends. The 2011 legal changes, as well as the intimidation of union leaders and 
the lack of success of the 2009 and 2010 protests against the ‘ austerity’ measures, led to 
a major decline in industrial action in  Romania since 2011 (Trif 2013). 
 Romania had the highest strike activity in the region before 2008. During the 1990s, 
the number of days not worked per thousand workers per annum was approximately 
twice the Eastern Europe average, although it represented less than two-thirds of the 
Western Europe average (Appendix A1.I). Between 2000 and 2008, Romanian unions 
continued to be among the most  militant in the region, but the number of protests 
decreased considerably. The available data indicate that the number of days not worked 
per thousand employees per annum more than halved in 2000–2008 compared with 
1995–1999 (Vandaele 2011: 11). During the 2000s, more than one-third of the days not 
worked due to strikes were in  education (37 per cent), followed closely by  manufacturing. 
Almost two-thirds of labour  disputes between 2003 and 2008 were triggered by wage 
 claims, while a quarter were triggered by  claims linked to restructuring, collective 
bargaining and social rights (Hayter et al. 2013: 77). 
The European Commission and the  IMF (2012) opposed the proposed legal changes 
by the centre-left government in 2012 concerning strengthening the security of 
collective bargaining (Trif 2016). Specifi cally, they resisted changes that, although 
making industrial action easier, sought a further reduction in unions’ infl uence, for 
example, through the restriction of legal protection for shop stewards. By contrast, 
they welcomed the proposed changes in relation to both the  representativeness criteria 
of local unions, lowering the threshold from over 50 per cent to 35 per cent, and the 
Figure 24.1 Company collective agreements (and additional acts), 2005–2014
Source: Guga and Constantin (2015: 131).
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number of members required to form a union, reduced from 15 to fi ve. In 2013, ILO 
representatives held discussions with the centre-left government and  Troika  oﬃ  cials 
about the need to amend the current labour laws to comply with the ILO conventions 
(Hayter et al. 2013). No signifi cant changes were made to the LDS until 2017, however. 
Levels of bargaining
The level of collective bargaining refers to whether bargaining takes place at the 
company or workplace, industrial, subindustrial or cross-industry levels. Before 2011, 
 Romania had a multi-layered collective bargaining system based on the  favourability 
principle, meaning that lower-level agreements could not impose worse employees’ 
terms and conditions than those set at higher levels. Until 2011, the starting point 
was the national collective agreement negotiated by the representative unions and 
employers’  confederations. The second layer consisted of  industrial agreements, 
negotiated by the representative unions and employers’ federations that covered 60 per 
cent of all employees in industries eligible for collective bargaining (Trif 2013). It was 
also possible to have other forms of  multi-employer bargaining involving regions or 
groups of companies, but these agreements were binding only for the  signatory parties. 
In contrast, national, industrial and company-level collective agreements concluded 
by representative parties covered all employers and employees in their respective 
bargaining unit before 2011. The third layer was the  company level, at which the actual 
terms and conditions of employment were established, as national and  industrial 
agreements set only  minimum standards, which local actors were allowed to improve 
(Trif 2008). There were 11,729 company collective agreements in 2008, covering most 
large unionised companies (Guga and Constantin 2015: 131–32). Notwithstanding 
pressures on the government from foreign  investors to reduce collective employment 
rights during the EU  accession process, unions managed to preserve multi-layered 
bargaining arrangements, which ensured both  vertical  coordination, through the 
 favourability principle, and  horizontal  coordination, through the  erga omnes one. 
Nevertheless, the foreign  investors’ quest for a fl exible labour market came to fruition 
in 2011. 
Despite opposition from the unions and the largest  employers’ associations, a radical 
 decentralisation of collective bargaining was pursued by the government unilaterally 
during the  recession (Ciutacu 2012). In 2009, the fi ve national union  confederations set 
up a crisis committee to protest against the ‘ austerity’ measures. They fi led a complaint 
with the ILO in 2010, claiming that the government was breaching union rights and 
freedoms. The unions also suggested over 400 measures to deal with the crisis. Their 
proposals, however, were largely ignored. As a result, the unions withdrew from most 
 tripartite bodies. Somewhat surprisingly, the four largest employers’ organisations, 
out of 13  confederations, covering almost two-thirds of the active  labour force, joined 
the fi ve union  confederations in their protest against the LDS by withdrawing from the 
national  tripartite institutions in 2011. They were against the LDS primarily because its 
provisions brought an end to their main role as employers’ representatives in national 
collective bargaining (Trif 2016). The cross-industry agreements also maintained  social 
peace and set minimum labour standards to ensure fair  competition between their 
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members. Finally, the unions organised a series of protests in 2010, demanding that 
the government guarantee implementation of collective agreements and eliminate legal 
restrictions on free collective bargaining. The protest actions of unions and  employers’ 
associations failed to prevent the government  dismantling the multi-level collective 
bargaining system, however.
Although collective bargaining has been decentralised, multi-employer agreements have 
not ceased to exist (Trif 2016). There were 24 multi-employer collective agreements 
valid in 2014; out of those, seven were labelled  industrial agreements, despite covering 
only companies belonging to associations that entered into collective agreements. 
Only four new  industrial agreements were concluded between 2011 and 2015, one 
of which was in  education (Stoiciu 2016:7). No new  industry-wide agreements were 
signed between 2011 and 2015 in the  private sector. Multi-employer bargaining for 
groups of companies survived, however, in highly unionised private industries, such 
as metalworking. In 2012, a small number of employers in the  automotive industry 
negotiated a two-year agreement including less than 10 per cent of the companies 
covered by the 2010 industrial agreement (Trif 2016). The importance of company-level 
collective agreements has therefore increased. The key diﬀ erence, however, is that since 
2011 company-level  social partners have been able to rely on higher level provisions in 
only a few exceptional cases. 
Summing up, collective bargaining structures in  Romania have undergone a dramatic 
process of  disorganised  decentralisation across all industries, reducing the levels of 
bargaining. In the context of outlawing  cross-industry bargaining and reducing the 
support for extension mechanisms at the industrial level in 2011,  multi-employer 
bargaining survived, albeit greatly weakened, only in industries/sub-industries 
with relatively strong unions, such as  metal (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). In industries 
and companies no longer covered by collective agreements, terms and conditions 
of employment vary greatly, contingent on the local labour market and employers’ 
 attitudes towards employees (Trif 2016). Moreover, in non-unionised companies it is 
often diﬃ  cult to enforce even the minimum legal standards.
Depth of bargaining 
Depth of bargaining refers to the extent of  involvement of local union  oﬃ  cials in the 
formulation of  claims and the implementation of collective agreements at  company 
level. It concerns three main dimensions: the level of collective bargaining, the  internal 
organisation of unions and  union density. Considerable depth is expected in a multi-
level bargaining system, in which relatively strong local unions have an important role 
in the negotiating process and agreement implementation (Paolucci 2017). In contrast, 
a lack of depth is a feature of a decentralised bargaining system, with weak  vertical links 
within the union  hierarchy and low density. Variations in depth are contingent on both 
the statutory and voluntary provisions framing the collective bargaining system. 
Before 2011, there was signifi cant  depth of bargaining in  Romania, linked to statutory 
provisions inherited from the  communist era. First, multi-level collective bargaining 
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was supported by the legal obligation to negotiate annual cross-industry agreements 
that covered all employees (Trif 2013). The provisions of these agreements could only 
be improved on by representative  social partners at the industrial and company levels 
due to the  favourability principle. Second, this principle also led to relatively strong 
 vertical links within the union  hierarchy, as higher level collective agreements provided 
a reference for lower level bargaining. In addition, the  erga omnes principle facilitated 
 horizontal cooperation between union organisations, which were required to negotiate a 
single collective agreement at each bargaining unit. The  favourability principle, coupled 
with the  erga omnes mechanisms, strengthened links between bargaining levels and 
the coherence of unions’ organisational structure and, at the same time, provided 
unions with external  legitimacy (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). For  social partners in  Romania 
it was not as critical as in the  United Kingdom or  Denmark to develop a strong  internal 
 legitimacy, referring to rank-and-fi le support and trust, because it was the law, and not 
membership, which guaranteed relatively deep bargaining before 2011.
In a context of low  internal  legitimacy of  social partners, the so-called ‘voluntary’ 
collective bargaining system imposed by the state in 2011 (Trif 2016) aﬀ ected all 
three dimensions of depth. First, the  neoliberal statutory (de) regulation through the 
LDS caused the  dismantling of multi-layer arrangements; this, in turn, reduced the 
 depth of bargaining by outlawing collective agreements at the cross-industry level and 
removing the  erga omnes principle at the industrial level. Consequently, company-level 
bargaining, even when it existed, is no longer supported by higher level provisions. 
Second, the lack of  cross-industry bargaining and the removal of extension mechanisms 
have weakened the  internal organisation of unions by taking away the incentives for 
 vertical and  horizontal cooperation. Third, there has been a signifi cant decline in  union 
density from about 33 per cent to approximately 20 per cent (Table 24.1). Finally, the 
threshold requirement for local unions to bargain has increased from 33 per cent to 50 
per cent (Trif 2013), making it more diﬃ  cult for parties to engage in negotiations. Thus, 
there was a path departure from relatively signifi cant depth prior to 2011 to a lack of 
depth between 2011 and 2015.
While empirical evidence shows rather a lack of depth in all industries, a degree of 
cross-industry variation emerges (Trif 2016). In the case of the highly-unionised  metal 
industry, which could be considered the best-case scenario,  multi-employer bargaining 
has survived. It takes place only at sub-industrial and company levels, however, and 
covers around 10 per cent of the companies that were under the  industrial agreements 
before 2011. Furthermore, the lack of national and  industrial agreements made company 
collective bargaining more diﬃ  cult for unions. Company-level  union representatives 
in two  metal companies reported that they had to start negotiations from scratch, 
while before 2011 they began negotiations from the provisions agreed at industrial 
level. Industry-wide agreements had better provisions regarding minimum wages,  pay 
increases linked to  infl ation, payment of overtime and so on. Union representatives 
revealed that they took for granted the provisions of the national and  industrial 
agreements, and realised their importance only when those agreements ceased to 
exist. Although cross-industry and  industrial agreements used to set only minimum 
employment standards, the company-level unions acknowledged that they were a 
great help, particularly in securing higher wages. Moreover, on the employers’ side, the 
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Ford Motor Company was one of the fi rst in  Romania to use  legal experts to negotiate 
collective agreements on their behalf. They reduced  lunch breaks, increased workloads 
and provided minimum compensation for injuries beside introducing irregular working 
hours in the 2011–2012 collective agreement. Thus using  legal experts to negotiate 
collective agreements on behalf of employers is a recent trend that has further enhanced 
employers’ infl uence over employment conditions, even in the highly unionised  metal 
industry. 
In the case of weakly unionised (under 1 per cent)  retail, the LDS led to the disappearance 
of cross-industry and  industrial agreements, resulting in a massive reduction of 
bargaining coverage (Trif 2016). Between 2011 and 2015, collective bargaining took 
place solely at  company level in a few large multinational corporations in which unions 
managed to achieve over 50 per cent density. In 2016, just four companies were 
covered by collective agreements, namely Carrefour, Selgros, Metro and Real (Trif and 
Stoiciu 2017: 172). The FSC union changed its organisng strategy from targeting all 
multinationals to focusing only on the most unionised companies. The objective was 
to reach the new threshold required for unions to conclude collective agreements. 
Strong leadership and international linkages have facilitated the organisng of workers, 
despite the dire legal framework. This was also the case in information technology 
when employers used aggressive cost-cutting strategies, including  outsourcing. These 
examples show how the removal of statutory provisions has reduced the institutional 
resources on which unions can draw. Under the new legal framework, unions can rely 
only on their  internal  legitimacy to secure any meaningful collective bargaining. Thus 
 union density has become the most important dimension of depth since 2011. 
In a context of reduced institutional support, unions at  company level depend entirely 
on employers’ good will, as well as on their ability to organise employees. Despite their 
increasing eﬀ orts at gaining  internal  legitimacy (Trif and Stoiciu 2017), the number of 
company-level collective agreements declined from 11,729 in 2008 to 8,726 in 2013 
(Figure 24.1). There was a major reduction of approximately 3,000 collective agreements 
between 2008 and 2010, although their number was increased since 2011. Considerable 
growth was registered in 2015, reaching a total of over 14,000 agreements (Stoiciu 
2016: 7). This could be linked to the 2015 legal change allowing union federations to 
conclude collective agreements in companies in which  union density is below 50 per 
cent. Overall, however, the empirical fi ndings show that the  depth of bargaining under 
the new voluntary system is signifi cantly lower. 
Institutional developments since 2011 thus have weakened each of the three dimensions 
of depth. This indicates a radical shift, from reliance on statutory provisions to voluntary 
provisions in achieving depth in collective bargaining. This institutional change is 
associated with variation in depth, from relatively high to low. The ways in which 
the recent institutional changes have impacted on the implementation of collective 
agreements will be addressed in the next section. 
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Degree of control of collective agreements
Level of control refers to the extent to which the actual terms and conditions of 
employment are set by collective agreements. This is contingent primarily on the type 
of  articulation mechanisms governing the relations between diﬀ erent bargaining levels 
and the dispute resolution mechanisms enforcing collective agreements. A high level 
of control is achieved when there are stable  articulation mechanisms specifying the 
distinct competencies of the  social partners at each level (Crouch 1993). In addition, 
the level of control relies on mandatory dispute resolution  procedures and  enforcement 
mechanisms in order to reduce the incidence of industrial action. In contrast, weak 
dispute resolution mechanisms and overlapping social partner competencies across 
levels reduce control, thereby creating uncertainty and confl icts between parties. 
Before 2011, the legal framework played a key role in providing control of agreements 
in  Romania. Articulation provided by the  favourability principle secured a stable 
 hierarchy between levels of collective bargaining and distinct competencies for the  social 
partners. In addition, the  erga omnes mechanisms extended the minimum employment 
standards negotiated at national and industrial levels to all workers within companies, 
which meant that managers and shop-stewards could negotiate only better provisions. 
The  erga omnes principle, together with the  favourability principle obliged the  social 
partners to coordinate their eﬀ orts both horizontally and vertically to produce a single 
collective agreement at national, industrial and company levels. Notwithstanding the 
formal mechanisms empowering  social partners to negotiate at diﬀ erent levels, the 
capacity to enforce collective agreements at the  company level was contingent on the 
balance of power between unions and managers. The fact that there were no specialised 
labour courts responsible for confl ict resolution meant that labour  disputes had to be 
referred to regular courts; according to union  oﬃ  cials, this mechanism trapped them in 
a very lengthy process, ending up sometimes with either employees changing jobs or the 
company changing ownership. 
The LDS destabilised  articulation mechanisms in 2011, making control over bargaining 
dependent almost exclusively on the balance of power between managers and local 
unions. Although the favourability and the  erga omnes principles continue to exist, they 
no longer represent a viable resource for  joint  regulation at the  company level due to the 
very limited multi-employer arrangements. This weak  articulation, combined with an 
already weak dispute resolution mechanism have worsened control over the  enforcement 
of collective agreements. Furthermore, it has become more diﬃ  cult to enforce certain 
court decisions in relation to collective bargaining since 2011. The agreement in the 
electrical and electronic  manufacturing industry negotiated for 2010–2014, for 
instance, included wage scales and other  benefi ts similar or superior to those stipulated 
in the cross-industry agreement. The agreement covered all companies in the industry, 
but after 2011 it could not be enforced. Likewise, an industrial agreement in the food 
industry was signed in 2010 and, despite its fi ve-year validity, could never be enforced 
(Trif 2016). In both industries, unions have taken legal action against employers who 
refused to implement the agreement. Although their action was successful in the food 
industry, there was no mechanism to force the parties to abide by the judges’ decision. 
There was a similar situation in  retail; the 2010 collective agreement was negotiated 
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for one year, while it was specifi ed that it should be extended until either one of the 
 signatory parties denounced it or until a new collective agreement was signed. Although 
it satisfi ed the extension criteria, it has not been implemented since 2011 (Trif 2016). 
In reality, it was particularly diﬃ  cult to enforce any industrial collective agreements 
between 2009 and 2015, in a context in which successive governments have taken a 
 neoliberal view of collective bargaining  decentralisation. 
Scope of agreements
The scope of agreements refers to the range of issues subject to negotiation at diﬀ erent 
levels. It concerns the extent to which terms and conditions of employment are set 
through  joint  regulation by the  social partners. Scope is wide when employers have 
restricted prerogatives, but extensive when  social partners negotiate over a wide spec-
trum of issues. Therefore it is aﬀ ected by both the extent and  depth of bargaining. Before 
2011, there was wide scope of bargaining at the cross-industry, industrial and company 
levels. The law imposed no restrictions on bargaining items at diﬀ erent levels, except for 
the  public sector, in which the government set wages, as long as collective agreements 
improved on minimum legal provisions and were in line with the  favourability principle. 
There was, however, a  provision indicating that wages, working hours and  working 
con ditions had to be covered by company agreements (Law 130/96). In addition, the 
 Labour Code obliged employers to negotiate with unions on a number of aspects, such 
as  workload (norma de lucru) and changes in job classifi cations and working time. The 
cross-industry and industry agreements covered a wide range of issues, from wage scales 
to procedural rules. The 2010 agreement in  retail covered procedural rules defi ning 
the applicability and validity of agreements, for instance, as well as substantive rules 
concerning work organisation, such as working time, wages and  training. This agree-
ment also included detailed provisions on  health and safety,  management or employers’ 
prerogatives, union  consultation rights,  regulation of individual  contracts and dispute 
resolution mechanisms. At the  company level,  social partners could both improve the 
provisions negotiated at the industrial level and cover additional aspects, as long as they 
were in favour of the employees. Nevertheless, very few large retailers were unionised 
or concluded company-level agreements. This case shows that even in a context of low 
unionisation, such as in  retail, the scope of bargaining was wide before 2011. 
The 2011 legal changes reduced the scope of bargaining by increasing employers’ 
prerogatives to set the terms and conditions of employment at  company level (Trif 2016). 
The disappearance of cross-industry, as well as the majority of  industrial agreements 
automatically decreased the number of items that are subject to  joint  regulation at these 
levels. In this context, the scope of bargaining is decided primarily by the  social partners 
at the  company level. Furthermore, the 2011 legal provisions narrowed the bargaining 
agenda at  company level. Apart from abolishing the requirement to negotiate on specifi c 
items, the obligation of employers to involve unions in decisions on  workload and job 
classifi cations was removed. This increase in managerial prerogatives has resulted in 
work intensifi cation and made it more diﬃ  cult for unions to negotiate bread-and-butter 
issues, such as wages and working time. Nevertheless, the degree of the reduction in the 
scope of bargaining has varied across industries and companies since 2011. 
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Public sector collective bargaining has registered the fewest changes, as legal restrictions 
concerning  joint  regulation of wages and working time existed prior to 2011. In contrast 
to the  private sector, highly unionised  education continues to have an industrial collec-
tive agreement covering similar issues to those negotiated prior to 2011. Nevertheless, 
the law plays a more important role in setting all aspects of remuneration, as the  social 
partners are no longer entitled to negotiate  variable  pay (Contractul colectiv de munca 
la nivel de ramura invatamant 2017). In addition, the 2009 public wage law signifi cantly 
reduced public wage funds in order to satisfy the  Troika’s preconditions for fi nancial 
assistance (Hayter et al. 2013). Apart from changing the wage grids by tying all public-
sector employees to a  wage scale defi ned in terms of multiples of a base wage of 600 
New Leu (around €150), this law obliged managers to reduce personnel costs by 15 per 
cent in 2009 (Trif 2016). In addition, the government imposed a 25 per cent wage cut for 
all public-sector employees (Trif 2013). Despite talks between government and unions, 
as well as mass protests against ‘ austerity’ measures, the labour strife had no tangible 
result for employees. The 2009 public wage law remained in place until 2017, while 
the 25 per cent  wage cuts were gradually restored by 2015 (Trif 2016). Although there 
was limited reduction of the number of items subject to joint regulations in the  public 
sector, as there was limited scope before 2011, the capacity of collective bargaining to 
improve  working conditions has been drastically reduced. This shows that not only the 
quantity of issues negotiated matters for the scope of bargaining, as Clegg’s framework 
(1976) suggests, but also the quality of the agreements reached. Thus both qualitative 
and quantitative aspects need to be considered when examining the scope of bargaining.
The case of the  metal industry illustrates an average degree of change in the scope of 
bargaining. The reduction of  joint  regulation in this highly unionised industry is linked 
to the absence of both cross-industry and  industrial agreements after 2011. The majority 
of employees work in large unionised companies covered by collective agreements. 
The evidence in four large unionised  metal companies exhibited great variation in the 
impact of the reforms on the actual terms and conditions of employment (Trif 2016). 
The degree of change in the scope of  joint  regulation varied from major alterations 
in the case of an employer who sought to avoid collective bargaining after 2011 to 
a large degree of continuity in a company at which the relations between the union 
and  management have been fairly cooperative, following industrial action in 2010; 
the other two cases fall between those two extremes. In companies at which  demand 
decreased during the  recession, employers used the new provisions of the  Labour Code 
to achieve more fl exible working time and introduce atypical  employment  contracts. 
While working time arrangements have been changed unilaterally by employers, wages 
and other terms and conditions of employment have been negotiated through collective 
bargaining in all four  metal companies. In companies with strong unions that were 
not severely aﬀ ected by the crisis, such as Dacia, the scope of bargaining has not been 
reduced. 
Finally, empirical evidence from  retail reveals a drastic reduction in the scope of 
bargaining. Apart from a lack of  multi-employer bargaining, the majority of workers 
are no longer covered by collective agreements in a context of very low  union density 
in this industry (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). Furthermore, the scope for negotiating working 
time and  workload has been reduced even in the four large multinationals covered 
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by collective agreements, due to the legal provisions entitling employers to set them 
unilaterally (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). Additionally, the company-level bargaining agenda 
began with a blank canvas after 2011. In contrast, the 2010 industrial agreement set 
several provisions that could only be improved at the  company level, including wages. 
The minimum  industry-wide wage negotiated by the  social partners was 50 RON above 
the national  minimum wage and represented the basic coeﬃ  cient for  indexation; the 
 unskilled workers’ wage index equalled one, that of skilled workers and experienced 
workers without formal qualifi cations equalled 1.2 and that of graduates equalled 1.5 
or higher, depending on their qualifi cations (Contractul colectiv de munca la nivelul 
ramurii de comert pe anul 2010). According to a senior union oﬃ  cial, the wage indexes 
were generally preserved after 2011 in the four company-level agreements, while the 
large majority of workers in  retail no longer benefi t from joint regulations, since 2011. 
Overall, in a context of  disorganised  decentralisation of collective bargaining associated 
with a major increase in employers’ prerogatives, it is not surprising that there is 
great variation across industries and companies. Empirical studies reveal that unions’ 
capacity to push certain items onto the bargaining agenda is contingent on their power 
resources, particularly their capacity to mobilise, as well as employers’ power resources, 
such as the availability of qualifi ed workers in a context of high  emigration and their 
willingness to become involved in collective bargaining (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). Thus the 
statutory support for a wide scope of bargaining was radically changed by the 2011 laws 
by making the bargaining agenda entirely dependent on the power relations between 
parties. As workers’ voice and  working conditions have deteriorated since 2008, many 
of them have ‘exited’ the Romanian labour market (Trif 2016). It is estimated that 
around three million people have emigrated over the past 25 years, more than half since 
2008 (Guga et al. 2018).
Conclusions
Developments in collective bargaining in  Romania since 2000 reveal two stories. The 
fi rst refers to ‘ path-dependent’ institutional changes until the 2008  recession, when 
the legal changes introduced by the 2003  Labour Code, as well as those associated with 
EU  accession in 2007 generally sought to strengthen the role of collective bargaining 
in regulating terms and conditions of employment. In contrast, the second refers to 
‘path departure’ in the form of a frontal attack on collective bargaining institutions, 
primarily through major legal changes in 2011 aimed at weakening the role of collective 
bargaining (Marginson 2015). The undermining of statutory rights in relation to security 
of bargaining resulted in the  dismantling of the multi-layered bargaining system, which, 
in turn, led to its  decentralisation and a massive decline in its coverage. Nevertheless, 
the ‘path departure’ period began in 2009, when the Romanian government started 
imposing procedural and substantive  austerity measures, such as the 25 per cent  wage 
cuts for all public-sector employees. This chapter argues that  Romania illustrates an 
extreme case of  disorganised  decentralisation of collective bargaining following the 
2008  recession, particularly due to  unilateral statutory changes in relation to the 
security, level and the extent of bargaining.
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The shift of the statutory provisions from supporting to hindering collective bargaining 
revealed the limited  internal  legitimacy of the  social partners. In this new institutional 
context, the capacity of unions to organise and mobilise workers for collective 
bargaining purposes relies primarily on their internal power resources in both the 
public and private sectors. Apart from aﬀ ecting the security of bargaining, the absence 
of external support has had a negative impact on all dimensions of collective bargaining. 
Unsurprisingly, the lack of  cross-industry bargaining and the reduction of industrial 
coverage increased the variation in the  social partners’ ability to jointly regulate terms 
and conditions of employment. Many employers have taken advantage of deregulation 
to undermine multi-employer arrangements and to reduce  joint  regulation at  company 
level. Nevertheless, their capacity to do so is also contingent on unions’ bargaining 
power. Consequently, joint regulations vary from multi-employer agreements in 
highly unionised industries, such as metalworking, to single-employer or no collective 
bargaining in the low unionised industries, such as  retail. 
The  path-dependent statutory institutions were disrupted in 2011 and rarely replaced 
by voluntary collective bargaining institutions. There are isolated cases in which 
unions with strong leadership and international linkages have managed to deploy 
voluntary arrangements to improve labour standards for both low and highly skilled 
employees, despite the grim legal framework (Trif and Stoiciu 2017). This allows one 
to be cautiously optimistic about the future of collective bargaining in  Romania. Major 
uncertainty remains, however, concerning the trade unions’ capacity to (re)build the 
trust and support necessary to enact a new collective bargaining system. This requires 
extreme dedication and commitment on the part of leaders who face the enormous 
challenge of breaking with the legacies of the past and turning public discourse around; 
they have to gain security by involving their rank-and-fi le members, who are not used 
to participating, without being able to rely on institutional resources, which historically 
have been their main lever of power.
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BNS Blocul Naţional Sindical ( National Trade Union Bloc)
CNIPMMR Consiliul Naţional al Întreprinderilor Private Mici şi Mĳ locii din România 
(National Council of Private Small and Medium-sized Enterprises)
CNPR Confederaţia Naţională a Patronatului Român (National Confederation of 
Romanian Employers)
CNSRL- Fratia Confederaţia Naţională a Sindicatelor Libere din România - Frăţia ( National 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions from  Romania - Frăţia)
CNS Cartel Alfa  Confederaţia Naţională Sindicală Cartel Alfa ( National Trade Union 
Confederation Cartel Alfa)
CSN Meridian  Confederaţia Sindicală Naţională Meridian ( Meridian National Trade Union 
Confederation)
Concordia Confederaţia Patronală Concordia ( Concordia Employers’ Confederation)
CONPIROM Confederaţia Patronală din Industria României ( Employers’ Confederation 
of Romanian Industry)
CSDR Confederaţia Sindicatelor Democratice din România (Confederation of 
Democratic Trade Unions of  Romania)
FSC Federaţia Sindicatelor din Comerţ ( Federation of Commerce Unions)
LDS Legea dialogului social ( Social Dialogue Act)
PNR Patronatul Naţional Român ( Romanian National Employers)
RON Romanian New Leu (Romanian currency)
UGIR 1903 Uniunea Generală a Industriaşilor din România 1903 ( General Union of 
Romanian Industrialists 1903)
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